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In Justice on the Fly: The Danger of Errant Deportations, Professors Fatma 
Marouf, Michael Kagan, and Rebecca Gill take on the ambitious task of 
answering the empirical questions posed by Justice Kennedy and others in 
Nken v. Holder with respect to the proper legal standard for judicial stays of 
removal in the immigration adjudication context. To answer these questions, 
the authors review, code, and analyze 1,646 cases in all circuits that hear 
immigration appeals and reveal stark differences in stay-of-removal practices 
and outcomes among the federal courts of appeals. This Response reflects on 
three of those findings: the disparity in stay grant rates among circuits, the 
variation by circuit in government opposition and immigration attorneys’ stay 
request practices, and the differences in Type I and Type II errors among 
circuits that apply the distinct legal standards. In addition to agreeing with 
Justice on the Fly that courts should adopt a uniform legal standard, the 
Response proposes a judicial solution that enhances court–agency dialogue to 
help courts handle the Federal Government’s misstatement in Nken about the 
ability of petitioners to return to the United States if they prevail on appeal. 
  
                                                                                                                       
 * Assistant Professor of Law, Michael E. Moritz College of Law, The Ohio State 
University. Many thanks to my former co-clerk Steven Shepard and my research assistant 
Chris LaRocco. Nken was decided the Term the Author clerked for Justice Kennedy—
though this Response does not purport to reveal any nonpublic information from that Term, 
much less suggest the views of the author’s former employer. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In January 2009, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Nken v. Holder 
to resolve a circuit split on the proper legal standard for judicial stays of 
removal in the immigration adjudication context.1 The Federal Government 
argued that it should be the “clear and convincing evidence” standard set forth 
in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA),2 whereas the Petitioner asserted 
that the less-stringent traditional four-factor test for preliminary injunctive relief 
should apply. On its face, this was a routine case. Deciding the proper legal 
standard (especially when there is confusion among the lower courts) is the 
bread and butter of the Supreme Court’s docket. Every year the Court decides 
such questions in a wide range of legal contexts from immigration, tax, and 
ERISA to affirmative action, criminal sentencing, and federal habeas—just to 
name a few.3  
Although the Court routinely articulates the proper legal standard based on 
existing law and policy considerations, the argument in Nken took a somewhat 
                                                                                                                       
 1 556 U.S. 418 (2009). Indeed, Justice Kennedy recognized this circuit split a half-
dozen years earlier. See Kenyeres v. Ashcroft, 538 U.S. 1301, 1303–04 (2003) (Kennedy, J., 
in chambers) (denying application for stay of removal) (noting that “[t]he question raised by 
applicant indeed has divided the Courts of Appeals” where “the Second, Sixth, and Ninth 
Circuits have examined the matter, both before and after the Eleventh Circuit’s decision . . . , 
and have reached a contrary result”). By the time Nken reached the Court, the split had 
apparently widened to 8–2, with the Fourth Circuit joining the short end of the split. See 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009) (No. 08-681), 2008 
WL 5369549, at *20 (2008). 
 2 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(2) (2012). 
 3 See, e.g., Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 
713 (2011) (holding that Chevron deference applies to judicial review of IRS statutory 
interpretations); Conkright v. Frommert, 559 U.S. 506, 509 (2010) (rejecting argument that 
“a single honest mistake in plan interpretation justifies stripping the [ERISA plan] 
administrator of that [judicial] deference for subsequent related interpretations of the plan”); 
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2415 (2013) (applying “the demanding 
burden of strict scrutiny articulated in Grutter” to affirmative action plan); Gall v. United 
States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007) (applying deferential abuse-of-discretion standard to “all 
[criminal] sentences—whether inside, just outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines 
range”); Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 13 (2013) (applying “doubly deferential standard” in 
federal habeas for “state court’s reasonable factual finding”). 
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unusual turn. The Justices were particularly interested in knowing whether the 
standard actually matters. In fact, the first question, from Chief Justice Roberts, 
queried whether the Petitioner’s counsel “happen[ed] to know empirically if 
most people who are facing removal get a stay”—to which counsel responded 
no.4 Justice Kennedy shortly followed up by asking whether it is “true that there 
are more petitions filed in the courts with the more generous standards”: “I 
would be curious to know, A, the percentage of the cases in which it’s granted; 
and B, the percentage of those cases that are ultimately decided in favor of the 
government . . . .”5 During the Government’s argument, the Chief renewed his 
empirical question, to which the Deputy Solicitor General replied: “[W]e do not 
have empirical data, and I wish we did, on the percentage, but [stays of 
removal] are—in the Ninth Circuit in our experience—again we don’t have 
percentages, but they are granted quite frequently.”6 
By a 7–2 vote, the Court ultimately agreed with the Petitioner that the 
proper standard is the traditional criteria for granting preliminary injunctions, 
though the Court emphasized that the standard is quite exacting.7 In particular, 
based on the Government’s (mis)representation that noncitizens “who are 
removed may continue to pursue their petitions for review, and those who 
prevail can be afforded effective relief by facilitation of their return, along with 
restoration of the immigration status they had upon removal,” the Court held 
that the harm of removal, without more, “is not categorically irreparable.”8 But 
the empirical questions remained. In a concurring opinion joined by Justice 
Scalia, Justice Kennedy repeated his call for more empirical data: 
No party has provided the Court with empirical data on the number of stays 
granted, the correlation between stays granted and ultimate success on the 
merits, or similar matters. The statistics would be helpful so that experience 
can demonstrate whether this decision yields a fair and effective result. Then, 
too, Congress can evaluate whether its policy objectives are being realized by 
the legislation it has enacted.9  
In Justice on the Fly: The Danger of Errant Deportations, Professors Fatma 
Marouf, Michael Kagan, and Rebecca Gill take on the ambitious project of 
collecting, coding, and analyzing such empirical data in the post-Nken world.10 
                                                                                                                       
 4 Oral Argument Transcript at 4, Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009) (No. 08-681). 
 5 Id. at 5. 
 6 Id. at 35. 
 7 Nken, 556 U.S. at 422, 435.  
 8 Id. at 435. 
 9 Id. at 437 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 10 Fatma Marouf, Michael Kagan & Rebecca Gill, Justice on the Fly: The Danger of 
Errant Deportations, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 338 (2014) [hereinafter Marouf, Kagan & Gill, 
Justice on the Fly]. Whereas the authors focus on error rates and related questions in Justice 
on the Fly, they explore issues related to the length of delay in a companion piece. See 
Michael Kagan, Fatma Marouf & Rebecca Gill, Buying Time? False Assumptions About 
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It turns out that Justice Kennedy’s request is no simple task. Stay decisions 
seldom make their way onto Westlaw or Lexis, so the authors had to mine the 
PACER dockets of 1,646 cases in all circuits that hear immigration appeals. 
From this data, the authors have unearthed valuable findings as to whether—to 
borrow from Justice Kennedy—a particular legal standard “yields a fair and 
effective result” and “whether [Congress’s] policy objectives are being realized 
by the legislation it has enacted.”11 
This Response is far less ambitious than the underlying empirical study, but 
endeavors to make two main points: Part II addresses the study’s key findings 
and their implications for immigration law, policy, and practice. This reaction 
does not do justice to the nuanced and detailed approach taken in Justice on the 
Fly, but hopefully will help enrich the dialogue among and within courts, the 
Executive, and Congress to evaluate the fairness and effectiveness of the current 
approach in the courts of appeals with respect to stays of removal.  
Part III returns to the problems with the standard articulated in Nken (which 
also may affect the policy implications of Justice on the Fly) and, in particular, 
how courts should handle the Government’s misstatement about the ability of 
petitioners to return to the United States if they prevail on appeal. This 
Response proposes a judicial solution that enhances court–agency dialogue and 
builds on the Author’s work in a related immigration context.12 Namely, courts 
of appeals should require that the Government certify in opposing stay-of-
removal motions that it will facilitate the petitioner’s readmission into the 
United States if the petitioner is ultimately successful on the merits of her 
petition; absent such certification, irreparable harm should be presumed. Such 
solution is justified by the study’s empirical findings on the prevalence of Type 
II errors (or false negatives, where the stay is denied but the petition is 
ultimately granted) and the importance of avoiding such errors when assessing 
irreparable harm.  
II. THE STUDY’S KEY FINDINGS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR 
IMMIGRATION LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 
At the outset, it is important to note what Justice on the Fly does not do. 
The study does not look back at pre-Nken practices in the courts of appeals to 
determine whether application of the traditional four-factor standard or the 
INA’s “clear and convincing evidence” standard affected the grant rate for stays 
of removal. Instead, the study is forward-looking and analyzes a remaining 
circuit split on how the traditional four-factor test should apply in the stay-of-
removal context.  
                                                                                                                       
Abusive Appeals, 63 CATH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) [hereinafter Kagan, Marouf & 
Gill, Buying Time?], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2399672. 
 11 Nken, 556 U.S. at 437 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 12 See Christopher J. Walker, The Ordinary Remand Rule and the Judicial Toolbox for 
Agency Dialogue, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) [hereinafter Walker, Judicial 
Toolbox for Agency Dialogue], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2242869.  
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As noted in Justice on the Fly, “[t]he disagreement centers on whether the 
four parts of the test can be applied according to a sliding scale, so that a 
particularly compelling showing on the irreparable harm factor can justify 
relaxing the standard for likelihood of success on the merits, or vice versa.”13 
The Nken Court did not resolve this conflict about whether a court can relax or 
“slide” a petitioner’s burden of proof for one of the four factors—i.e., likelihood 
of success on the merits, irreparable harm absent a stay, substantial injury to 
others, or the public interest14—based on a very strong showing on another.  
In the same Term as Nken, however, the Court cast doubt on the legitimacy 
of the sliding-scale approach in the preliminary injunction context—rejecting 
the Ninth Circuit’s rule that, “when a plaintiff demonstrates a strong likelihood 
of prevailing on the merits, a preliminary injunction may be entered based only 
on a ‘possibility’ of irreparable harm.”15 Despite this ruling, within the time 
period analyzed for this study (2009–2012), four circuits continued to apply the 
sliding scale, three had expressly rejected it, and the rest were somewhere in 
between.16 The data set thus appears to provide a suitable vehicle for analyzing 
whether the legal standard matters in addition to whether either standard yields 
a fair and effective result. This Response highlights three main findings. 
1. Circuit Disparity in Stay Grant Rate. The study found that about one 
in four (26%) stay motions were granted. That overall rate, however, masks 
great disparity among the circuits. The stay grant rate ranged from 63% in the 
Ninth Circuit to only 4% in the Fifth Circuit, with the First (29%), Third (21%), 
Fourth (14%), Sixth (48%), Seventh (31%), Eighth (10%), Tenth (6%), and 
Eleventh (6%) Circuits in between.17 This disparate treatment among circuits is 
not unique to the stay-of-removal context, but may reflect broader systemic 
issues in judicial review of immigration adjudications. For instance, a smaller-
scale empirical study on the application of administrative law’s ordinary 
remand rule in the immigration adjudication context reveals similar disparity 
among courts of appeals—with an overall compliance rate with the remand rule 
of 81% yet a range from 100% to 67%.18 And the most expansive empirical 
study on immigration adjudication to date similarly finds “amazing disparities 
in grant rates,” such that the process was compared to “refugee roulette.”19 The 
                                                                                                                       
 13 Marouf, Kagan & Gill, Justice on the Fly, supra note 10, at 349–50. 
 14 See Nken, 556 U.S. at 426. 
 15 Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 21 (2008). 
 16 See Marouf, Kagan & Gill, Justice on the Fly, supra note 10, at 353–56. 
 17 See id. at 364–65, 365 fig.1. The Second Circuit is excluded from this analysis 
because it has an agreement with the Federal Government to issue an automatic temporary 
stay that remains in effect until the petition is resolved. See id. at 364 & n.126. 
 18 Walker, Judicial Toolbox for Agency Dialogue, supra note 12, Part II.A & tbl.1.  
 19 Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette: 
Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 296 (2007). It should be noted, 
however, that Justice on the Fly found less circuit-by-circuit disparity in the grant rate of 
underlying petitions, which ranged from 3% to 20%, than in the grant rate for stays of 
removal. See Table 1 infra. 
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raw numbers thus suggest that the likelihood of receiving a stay may well 
depend in large part on which circuit reviews the agency’s removal order—
something that neither the Supreme Court nor Congress (nor the Executive, for 
that matter) would find to be fair or effective. 
2. Other Disparities. The disparities are not limited to the judicial branch. 
Only about half (55%) of petitioners sought stays of removal with great 
disparity among circuits, ranging from 25% in the Eleventh Circuit to 94% in 
the Ninth Circuit.20 The overall Federal Government opposition rate is 71%, but 
it ranges from 18% in the Tenth Circuit to 99% in the Eleventh.21 Table 1 
provides the circuit-by-circuit comparison of rates for stay grants, requests, and 
oppositions along with the petition grant rate for the cases reviewed.22  
Table 1: Circuit-by-Circuit Summary 
 
 
                                                                                                                       
 20 Marouf, Kagan & Gill, Justice on the Fly, supra note 10, at 368–69 & fig.2. 
 21 Id. at 374–75 & fig.3. One might think that the Government’s rate of opposition 
would be less in cases involving asylum, withholding, or Convention Against Torture (CAT) 
claims as the chance of irreparable harm from removal may be heightened in those contexts, 
but the study found no statistically significant difference between those claims and non-
persecution-based claims. See id. at 375–76 & fig.4. 
 22 Table 1 draws on Marouf, Kagan & Gill, Justice on the Fly, supra note 10, at 365–76 
& figs.1, 2 & 3, as well as additional data graciously provided by the authors of the study. 
The circuit-by-circuit statistics included in both tables report percentages from the 
overlapping data sets that include a random sample of 100 cases from each circuit plus an 
over-sample of cases where stays were requested such that there are 100 cases per circuit 
with stay requests. See id. at 364–65 (describing the two data sets). 
Court of 
Appeals
Sliding-
Scale 
Approach
Stay Grant 
Rate
Stay 
Request 
Rate
Gov't 
Opposition 
Rate
Petition 
Grant Rate
First Circuit Unclear 29% 44% 42% 4%
Second Circuit Yes * 99% 44% 6%
Third Circuit No 21% 48% 90% 7%
Fourth Circuit No 14% 30% 88% 7%
Fifth Circuit Unclear 4% 49% 90% 3%
Sixth Circuit Yes 48% 70% 69% 7%
Seventh Circuit Yes 31% 38% 46% 20%
Eighth Circuit Unclear 10% 58% 80% 6%
Ninth Circuit Yes 63% 94% 71% 10%
Tenth Circuit Unclear 6% 50% 18% 8%
Eleventh Circuit No 6% 25% 99% 9%
Total: 26% 55% 71% 8%
* The Second Circuit has automatic temporary stay practice.
Table 1. Circuit-by-Circuit Summary
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The disparities among these rates should send a strong message to the 
Executive Branch, Congress, courts, and immigration attorneys. For instance, as 
Justice on the Fly recommends, the Justice Department’s Office of Immigration 
Litigation (OIL) should collect its own data on stay-of-removal motions, 
oppositions, and grant rates. Because the study finds that the Government’s 
opposition has a “dramatic impact on the likelihood of [the petitioner] being 
granted a stay,” OIL should reexamine its procedures and practices to ensure 
consistent application of the law among similarly situated noncitizens in the 
various circuits.23 Not only would such systemic review and implementation 
enhance the critical policy objective of uniform administration of the law, but it 
would also help better leverage Executive Branch expertise, encourage efficient 
allocation of government resources, and promote equity in the administration of 
federal immigration law.  
Similarly, immigration attorneys should recalibrate their cost–benefit 
analysis on whether to seek a stay of removal in light of the actual request and 
grant rates in the relevant circuit. This is particularly necessary when one 
considers the study’s finding that nearly half (48%) of those petitioners who 
prevailed in their appeals never moved for a stay of removal.24 Likewise, as 
Justice on the Fly documents, failure to adequately brief the stay factors 
increases the likelihood of an opposition from the Government25—thus further 
decreasing the likelihood of success in court. Accordingly, attorneys should 
thoroughly brief the stay request in accordance with Nken’s guidance and the 
applicable circuit precedent. 
3. Impact of Sliding-Scale Approach. With these disparities in mind, what 
can or should Congress or courts do to ensure a more consistent, efficient, and 
equitable administration of federal immigration law? Justice on the Fly suggests 
an immediate and critical step: courts should adopt the sliding-scale approach to 
the traditional four-factor test for stays of removal.26 The study finds that there 
is a strong correlation between the adoption of the sliding-scale approach and 
higher stay grant rates.27 The more important inquiry, however, is whether that 
increased grant rate is accompanied by increased Type I (false positives) and/or 
Type II (false negatives) errors.28 Here, false positives occur when the court 
grants the stay motion yet ultimately denies the petition—thus prohibiting the 
Government from removing a petitioner during the pendency of an unsuccessful 
appeal. By contrast, false negatives take place when the court denies the stay 
                                                                                                                       
 23 Id. at 399–400. 
 24 Id. at 380. 
 25 See id. at 402. 
 26 Marouf, Kagan & Gill, Justice on the Fly, supra note 10, at 395. 
 27 See id. at 390–91. The authors are careful to note that other factors—and in 
particular, the procedural differences in how circuits handle stay-of-removal motions—also 
influence grant rates, see id. at 391, and they explore those procedures in Kagan, Marouf & 
Gill, Buying Time?, supra note 10. 
 28 See generally R.S. Radford, Statistical Error and Legal Error: Type One and Type 
Two Errors and the Law, 21 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 843 (1988). 
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motion yet ultimately grants the petition—thus allowing the Government to 
remove during the appeal a petitioner who is ultimately adjudicated to be 
entitled to remain in the United States.29 
Not unsurprisingly, the study finds that the more petitioner-friendly sliding-
scale approach reduces the number of false negatives but increases the number 
of false positives. As for the false negatives, the study reveals that sliding-scale 
circuits committed Type II errors 27% of the time when they denied a stay 
motion, whereas non-sliding-scale circuits committed such errors at a 57% rate. 
The disparity is even greater in the context of persecution-based claims 
(asylum, withholding, and CAT claims) where non-sliding-scale circuits make 
nearly three times as many Type II errors as sliding-scale circuits (55% to 
19%). This increased disparity should raise concerns as the likelihood of 
irreparable harm is more acute in the context of a petitioner who is removed 
(likely to the land of such persecution) yet ultimately prevails on a persecution-
based claim. As for false positives, the study reveals that sliding-scale circuits 
committed Type I errors 46% of the time when they granted a stay motion, 
while non-sliding-scale circuits committed such errors at a 10% rate. The 
difference in persecution-based cases changed to 50% and 9%, respectively.30 
Table 2 provides the circuit-by-circuit comparison on stay and petition grant 
rates along with rate of Type I and Type II errors.31 
 
  
                                                                                                                       
 29 To call these “errors” is a bit misleading as courts balance four factors when 
determining whether to grant a stay:  
(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on 
the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) 
whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the 
proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies. 
Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 426 (2009). In other words, even if the stay motion is denied 
but the petition is ultimately granted (or vice versa), that does not necessarily mean the court 
committed legal error in denying (or granting) the stay as the other three factors may cut the 
other way. That said, as a matter of equity and efficiency, these are errors because false 
negatives result in unnecessary deportations and false positives result in petitioners 
remaining in the country longer than the Government may prefer. 
 30 Marouf, Kagan & Gill, Justice on the Fly, supra note 10, at 390–91 tbls.3 & 4. Both 
the Type I and Type II error rates reported here are based on the subset of cases where the 
petition was ultimately granted. Although the overall size of the sample is robust, it should 
be noted that the numbers for Type I and Type II errors are quite small for some circuits. 
 31 Table 2 draws on Marouf, Kagan & Gill, Justice on the Fly, supra note 10, at 364–65 
& fig.1, as well as additional data provided by the study’s authors. 
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Table 2: Type I and II Errors by Circuit 
 
Administrative law cares about both types of errors as a matter of 
consistency, efficiency, and equity.32 And Congress may well want to intervene 
to exercise its policy judgment. In this context, however, Justice on the Fly 
seems to have the better argument that courts and Congress should care more 
about Type II errors/false negatives—where the court denies a stay motion but 
ultimately grants the relief sought in the petition—than Type I errors/false 
positives. The consistency and equity arguments are straightforward in that 
applying one standard nationwide should lead to more uniform application of 
the law, and choosing the more petitioner-friendly standard reduces the Type II 
errors that could lead to irreparable harm. This is particularly true in the context 
of persecution-based claims where the chance of irreparable harm is more acute 
and the difference in Type II errors is even greater among the approaches. Even 
as a matter of efficiency, there is a credible argument that it is more efficient to 
minimize Type II errors (that involve erroneously removing and then returning 
noncitizens) at the expense of some additional Type I errors (that involve 
merely allowing ultimately removable noncitizens to remain in the United 
States pending appeal). 
Accordingly, Justice on the Fly makes a persuasive argument that courts 
should adopt a sliding-scale standard when evaluating stay-of-removal motions. 
                                                                                                                       
 32 See generally Stephanie Hoffer & Christopher J. Walker, The Death of Tax Court 
Exceptionalism, 99 MINN. L. REV, Part III.A (forthcoming 2014) (exploring policy 
considerations of consistency, efficiency, equity, and expertise for deference to federal 
agency action), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2393412.  
Court of 
Appeals
Sliding-
Scale 
Approach
Stay Grant 
Rate
Petition 
Grant Rate
Type I  
Error Rate
Type II 
Error Rate
First Circuit Unclear 29% 4% 27% 50%
Second Circuit Yes * 6% * *
Third Circuit No 21% 7% 14% 0%
Fourth Circuit No 14% 7% 12% 71%
Fifth Circuit Unclear 4% 3% 4% 100%
Sixth Circuit Yes 48% 7% 41% 0%
Seventh Circuit Yes 31% 20% 16% 21%
Eighth Circuit Unclear 10% 6% 10% 100%
Ninth Circuit Yes 63% 10% 58% 47%
Tenth Circuit Unclear 6% 8% 3% 67%
Eleventh Circuit No 6% 9% 5% 89%
Total: 26% 8% 22% 47%
Table 2. Type I and II Errors by Circuit
* The Second Circuit has automatic temporary stay practice.
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And, as discussed in Part III, adoption of the sliding-scale approach is even 
more important in light of the Government’s post-Nken confession of error that 
petitioners who prevail on their claims may not be able to reenter the United 
States after a removal. 
III. THE GOVERNMENT’S CONFESSION OF ERROR AND A POTENTIAL PATH 
FORWARD 
The study’s key findings may be affected by the Nken Court’s reliance on a 
factual misstatement made by the Federal Government. In holding that “the 
burden of removal alone cannot constitute irreparable injury,”33 the Court relied 
on the Government’s representation that noncitizens “who are removed may 
continue to pursue their petitions for review, and those who prevail can be 
afforded effective relief by facilitation of their return, along with restoration of 
the immigration status they had upon removal.”34 Three years after the opinion 
in Nken was issued, the Solicitor General informed the Court that the 
Government did not actually have a policy or practice to allow noncitizens to 
return to the United States if they prevailed in their appeals and that the 
Government would not rely on that Nken conclusion about no irreparable 
harm.35 It is not clear when the Government ceased to rely on this 
representation in the courts of appeals, much less if or when the courts of 
appeals abandoned such take on irreparable harm or how this misrepresentation 
affects the circuit-by-circuit findings in this study. 
More importantly, scholars, commentators, and litigators have struggled 
with how to respond to the Court’s reliance on this misstatement. Professor 
Nancy Morawetz, for instance, makes a compelling case that government self-
regulation of misstatements is problematic and that courts should take remedial 
action to ensure proper administration of justice: 
Unless the Court or lower courts take remedial action, the court system is left 
relying on what is little more than an advisory opinion—a statement of the rule 
if a hypothetical state of affairs were to exist. This undermines the foundation 
of our legal system, which requires that courts decide cases and controversies 
and not hypothetical questions.36 
The question then becomes what type of judicial remedy would be fair and 
effective in the stay-of-removal context. 
This Response suggests that the courts of appeals have already developed a 
number of novel judicial tools in the immigration adjudication context to 
enhance their dialogue with federal agencies and that courts should craft a 
                                                                                                                       
 33 Nken, 556 U.S. at 435. 
 34 Id. 
 35 See Marouf, Kagan & Gill, Justice on the Fly, supra note 10, at 348–49 & nn.51–55. 
 36 Nancy Morawetz, Convenient Facts: Nken v. Holder, the Solicitor General, and the 
Presentation of Internal Government Facts, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1600, 1663 (2013). 
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similar dialogue-enhancing tool here. As chronicled elsewhere in the context of 
administrative law’s ordinary remand rule, these tools include: requesting notice 
of the agency’s decision on remand, retaining jurisdiction of the petition, setting 
a timeline for remand, providing hypothetical solutions, certifying issues for 
remand, and suggesting the transfer of the matter to another immigration judge. 
Of particular relevance here, courts of appeals at times also seek concessions 
from the Government at argument or otherwise during judicial review.37 
Here, federal courts of appeals should seek a similar concession in the stay-
of-removal context. Namely, at the stay application briefing stage, courts should 
require that the Federal Government concede that it will facilitate the 
petitioner’s return to the United States in the event that she is successful on 
appeal and perhaps work out those details in advance with the petitioner.38 If 
the Government fails to make such concession, the harm alleged by the 
petitioner should be presumed irreparable, which admittedly is the opposite 
approach than that counseled by the Nken Court.39  
Such an approach would not be unprecedented, as the Second Circuit and 
the Government have a somewhat similar agreement that the Government will 
not remove a petitioner while a stay motion is pending (and the Second Circuit 
thus does not typically rule on the stay motion until it rules on the underlying 
petition).40 Furthermore, this dialogue-enhancing tool is justified by the study’s 
empirical findings on the prevalence of Type II errors (or false negatives) and 
the importance of avoiding such errors in a determination of irreparable harm. 
After all, non-sliding-scale circuits commit Type II errors 57% of the time when 
they denied a stay motion, and even sliding-scale circuits commit such errors at 
a 27% rate. The data presented in Justice on the Fly reinforce the conclusion 
that it would be more fair and effective to shift the burden on the Government to 
disprove irreparable harm if the Government is unwilling to guarantee that it 
will facilitate the petitioner’s return to the United States. 
  
                                                                                                                       
 37 Walker, Judicial Toolbox for Agency Dialogue, supra note 12, Part II.C, Part III &  
tbl.2; see, e.g., Sandoval v. Holder, 641 F.3d 982, 987 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 38 As noted in Justice on the Fly, the Government’s current attempts to remedy the 
situation may not go far enough to facilitate a petitioner’s return, especially considering that 
many petitioners lack financial means to pay the court filing fees yet would be required to 
pay for their international travel back to the United States. See Marouf, Kagan & Gill, 
Justice on the Fly, supra note 10, at 348, 349 n.55. 
 39 See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009) (holding that “the burden of removal 
alone cannot constitute the requisite irreparable injury”). 
 40 See Marouf, Kagan & Gill, Justice on the Fly, supra note 10, at 364 n.126; see also 
Kagan, Marouf & Gill, Buying Time?, supra note 10, at *31–*32 (exploring Second Circuit 
situation in more detail). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Justice on the Fly presents yet another bleak picture about the current state 
of immigration adjudication. The disparate treatment of stay-of-removal 
motions among the courts of appeals—as well as among the Government’s 
opposition practices and immigration attorneys’ stay request patterns—calls 
into question the consistent, efficient, and equitable administration of federal 
immigration law. Much work needs to be done to ensure, as Chief Justice 
Roberts remarked in writing for the Court in Nken, that “[t]he choice for a 
reviewing court should not be between justice on the fly or participation in what 
may be an idle ceremony.”41 
Moreover, the study’s findings confirm Justice Kennedy’s intuition about 
the importance of empirical data in this area of immigration law—and in the 
context of competing legal standards more generally—“so that experience can 
demonstrate whether [Nken] yields a fair and effective result” and that 
“Congress can evaluate whether its policy objectives are being realized by the 
legislation it has enacted.”42 Justice on the Fly provides an excellent model for 
how such empirical study can be conducted. Hopefully other scholars will 
follow suit, and the various actors here (courts, Congress, the Executive Branch, 
and immigration attorneys) will apply the insights uncovered to improve federal 
immigration law, policy, and practice. 
 
                                                                                                                       
 41 Nken, 556 U.S. at 427 (internal quotation omitted). 
 42 Id. at 437 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
